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Though people in developing countries make
up around 80 percent of the world's population,
they only account for 20 percent of worldwide
pharmaceutical sales.' Global health research
dedicates less than 10 percent of its spending to
those diseases that primarily affect the poorest 90
percent of the world's population, also known as
the "10/90 gap.' 2 Unfortunately, ensuring access
to medicine in developing countries proves
difficult.3
In 1995. the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") created
obligatory standards of intellectual property
protection by xvhich WTO member countries
must abide.4 In 2001, amid mounting concern
from developing countries regarding access
to medicine, the WTO adopted the Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.5
The Declaration recognized the problem many
developing countries were having with accessing
necessary medicine and, as a result, held that
the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent WTO
member countries from protecting public health.6
Although the Doha Declaration admitted the
importance of intellectual property protection,
it affirmed WTO members' right to use the
flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement, which
could suspend patent protection.8
The right to exploit the flexibilities in the TRIPS
Agreement was further emphasized in 2003
when the council announced its decision to all ow
developing countries that lacked the ability to
manufacture pharmaceuticals domestically to
issue compulsory licenses to obtain medicine
from other countries.) Prior to this announcement,
because of the wording of Article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement, developing countries without
domestic manufacturing capabilities could not
utilize the benefits of compulsory licenses.10
The 2003 council decision made it easier for
all countries to take advantage of compulsory
licensing and, in doing so, authorized lesser
patent protection.1 II
However, the flexibilities provided by the
TRIPS Agreement and reaffirmed in the Doha
Declaration and the council decision of 2003
may not be in the best interest of developing
countries. This paper considers the role of
intellectual property rights in the development
of pharmaceuticals by exploring the patent
protection offered in the TRIPS Agreement and
contrasting it with the flexibilities enhanced in the
Doha Declaration and 2003 council decision. Part
II provides background on the TRIPS Agreement,
Doha Declaration, and council decision of 2003.
This section also clarifies the importance of
the patent system for pharmaceutical research,
development, and innovation. 12  Part III
considers the Doha Declaration, specifically its
promotion of compulsory licenses and parallel
imports, and illustrates the detrimental effects
it has on public health." Part IV recommends
alternative approaches that would provide
medication xwhile still protecting pharmaceutical
innovation. The first approach advocates the use
of data exclusivity, which protects the patent
registrant's data from generic knockoffs. 14 The
second approach supports mechanisms like cost-
sharing and prize funds, which enable generic
medications but provide adequate remuneration
to the pharmaceutical patent holder so that
they may effectively recoup the cost of their
investment.15 And the third approach promotes
price differentiation, charging different prices
in different markets, to enable innovation.1-6
This section also emphasizes the role that
countries themselves play in providing access
to medicines and reconmmends strong domestic
legislation for providing access to medicine1 '
Finally, Part V concludes with the assertion that
strong patent protection is xvital for access to nexw
pharmaceuticals in dev eloping countries.
A. The TRIPS Agreement
On April 15, 1994, members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) signed what has become an incredibly controversial
agreement: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).1 The TRIPS Agreement requires WTO
Members to adhere to defined standards of intellectual property
protection while attempting to strike a compromise between the
long-term objective of providing incentives for innovation and the
short-term objective of utilizing existing ideas, products, and other
inventions.19 The TRIPS Agreement covers a broad spectrum of
products, but its effect on access to pharmaceuticals has raised the
most concern.)
The TRIPS Agreement prov ides flexibilities that relax its patent
protection requirements.21 Article 31 allows for the use of a patented
product without the patent holder's authorization and thus provides
the most important exceptions to the TRIPS Agreement.22 Member
countries have interpreted Article 31 to allow for compulsory
licenses 23 and parallel imports.24 This interpretation has created a
conflict with those in favor of strong patent protection.25
B. The Doha Declaration
After the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO member
nations expressed concern regarding the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement, which many believed increased the cost of medicine.
The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in 2001 in Doha,
Qatar, addressed these concerns with the adoption of the Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (also known as the
Doha Declaration).27
The Doha Declaration emphasized the WTO's commitment to
promoting public health and affinned the right of WTO countries
to use the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreemeut to meet this goal. 8
Specifically, the Doha Declaration confirmed the use of compulsory
licensing as an acceptable measure to promote public health.29
The Doha Declaration also pronounced the freedom of member
countries to establish their own policies on the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights.39 In doing so, the Doha Declaration
gave each country the right to determine whether to authorize
parallel imports.3
Known as the TRIPS "flexibilities," compulsory licensing and
paiallel imports seive as the central source of contcntion vvithi the
Doha Declaration. Though the Doha Declaration did not change
any prov isions vwithin the TRIPS Agreemcnt, it was nonetheless
significant because it reinterpreted the ITRIPS Agreement in a way
that emphasized the right ofWITO memhers to use these flexibilities
to protect public health.3 2
1. Parallel JImportis
Paiallel importation occurs whcn the patent holder sells a diug
to a country and thc buyer exports the ding to anothcr countiry-
without the authorization of the patent holder-where the price
for the patented drug is higher. The existence of parallel imports
depends on the domestic legislation of the exporting country.34 if
the country's domestic legislation extinguishes the rights of the
patent holder once the product sells, then parallel importation will
likely occur. For instance, if domestic legislation forces a patent
holder to relinquish her rights to the product once it sells, then
the patent holder cannot further regulate the product and has no
legal right to prevent the sale of the product to a more expensive
market (parallel importation).15 However, if the domestic legislation
prohibits the exhaustion of the patent holder's rights, then the patent
holder can prevent parallel importation because she still has rights
to the product. 36
The following example further clarifies parallel importation
and illuminates the importance of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights. Suppose a pharmaceutical patent holder sells a
drug into the market of Country X for $1/unit. In Country Y, the
patent holder charges $2/unit. If, after selling the product. the patent
holder exhausts his rights, he has no right to prevent Country X
from exporting the drug to Country Y, charging a lesser amount (i.e.
parallel importation), and thereby undercutting the patent holder's
desired price in Country Y.37 To enhance access to medication,
pharmaceutical companies will often sell drugs in developing
markets for discounted prices. However, the parallel importation
of medicine into more expensive markets hurts these companies
financially and, therefore, deters such philanthropy. 8
The TRIPS Agreement does not address the principle of exhaustion
and parallel imports, but the Doha Declaration actually enforces
them both.39 The TRIPS Agreement specifically reads, "nothing in
this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion
of intellectual property rights."'40 By not addressing the topic, the
TRIPS Agreement avoids encouraging WTO member countries to
take a particular stance on the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights.41 Conversely, by leaving the decision of whether to authorize
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights up to the individual
countries, the Doha Declaration validates the use of parallel
imports.42
2. Conpulsory Licenses
A compulsory license is the governmental authorization to itself or
a third party to use a patent without the permission of the actual
patent holder.43 TIhe ITRIPS Agreement establishes a country's
ahility to issue a compulsory license, and the Doha Declaration
reinforces that right.44 Specifically, the Doha Declaration states,
"Each memher has the right to grant compulsory licenses amnd the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted." 45 The henefit of compulsory licenses, howev er, is a pivotal
point of dispute hetween those who faxvor stronger patent protection
and those who do not.46
The TRIPS Agreement specifically states that WTO inemher
countries may authorize compulsory licenses for "'the supply of
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use." 47 This
means that a WTO member country may, without the authorization
of the patent holder, authorize a compulsory license, either to
the government or to someone within that country, to reproduce
a patented product within its own borders and for its domestic
market.48 A country cannot export a product produced under a
compulsory license. This is problematic for those countries lacking
domestic manufacturing capabilities that are thereby prevented
from importing products manufactured in another country under a
compulsory license.49 Ihis language affected countries like Brazil
and India, which heavily exported drugs to countries without
domestic manufacturing capabilities, o as well as the countries that
relied on these imported drugs. 5
In paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, the WTO ministers
recognized that countries lacking domestic manufacturing
capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties
in effectively using compulsory licensing under the TRIPS
Agreement.5' Ihe WTO ministers instructed the Council for TRIPS
to find "an expeditious solution" so that countries unable to produce
pharmaceuticals domestically can import patented drugs made
under compulsory license.5 The WTO General Council adopted
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on August 30, 2003.54
C. The Council Decision
In 2003, the Council for TRIPS agreed to waive temporarily
the domestic supply requirements of Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement, thereby allowing countries to import products made
under compulsory license in another country.i The council held
that the inability of least developed countries to access medicine
constituted an "exceptional circumstance" warranting a waiver of
the obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.56
D. The Importance of Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical
Development
Intellectual property rights and patent protection serve as a critical
stimulus for pharmaceutical innovation.5 In contrast to many
other research-intensive industries (such as the computer industry),
the pharmaceutical industry heavily relies on patent protection. 8
Pharmaceutical companies view patents as a necessity because of
the extremely lengthy, expensive, laborious, and risky research and
development process for pharmaceuticals.t From the discovery of
the drug to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval takes ten
to fifteen years, and only one out of exvery five thousand medicines
tested receives FDA approval>0o Prior to tbe introduction of a new
drug, research and development results in a negatixve cash flow for
pharmaceutical companies. 6m Because the maiority of drugs are
not successful, pharmaceutical companies must recoup the costs
of their inv estments in their highly profitable drugs>" Thus, these
few successful drugs serve as the money making source and thereby
sustain the company.6^
C ompetition from generic drugs prov ides substantial risk to the
investment of pharinac eutical dev elopment, thus, xvithout patent
protection, the pharmaceutical company's investments in research
and development are jeopardized.6 The upfront costs associated
with pharmaceutical production, such as research and development,
account for 70 percent ofthe drug cost, while manufacturing accounts
for only 30 percent." Thus, absent patent protection, a generic drug
manufacturer could reproduce the drug for a fraction of the cost and
sell it for less than the patent holder.6 Because the manufacturing
costs are significantly less than the research and development costs
that the patent holder pays, the generic manufacturer does not have
to recover this expense in the form of higher prices.67 When the
same product is sold in the same market for two different prices,
consumers will most likely buy the less expensive generic version.68
Thus, the patent holder takes on all of the cost of creating the drug
and gets little in return.
Because it takes many years to recoup the high costs associated
with drug research and development, an effective patent life is
a particularly important economic incentive for innovation.69
Absent a period of restricted competition, pharmaceutical creators
cannot recoup their research and development costs and will lack
any incentive to continue to develop new drugs.0 Thus, patent
provisions serve as the primary incentive for commercial enterprises
to undertake research and development on new and innovative
pharmaceutical products.
A. The lack of patent protection established in the Dohn
Declaration contradicts the intent of the TRIPS Agreement.
The preamble to the TRIPS Agreement presents the desire among
WTO members to promote international trade, which the TRIPS
Agreement recognizes as requiring adequate and effective protection
of intellectual property rights.72 However, the patent protections
encoded in the TRIPS Agreement, which prevents against the
unauthorized use of the product by a third party, are essentially
eviscerated in the Doha Declaration's commitment to compulsory
licensing> The TRIPS Agreement focuses predominantly on
the importance of intellectual property protection and recognizes
the dependency of innovation on intellectual property protection,
whereas the Doha Declaration takes a substantial step back from
this position by relinquishing a large portion of the patent owner's
exclusivity by permitting compulsory licensing and parallel
imports.74
Ihough the Doha Declaration recognizes the importance of
intellectual property protection in developing new medicines, it
declares that a decrease in patent protection through compulsory
licenses is essential to promoting public health 7 " The Doha
Declaration notes that the development of new medicine relies on
intellectual property protection but simultaneously proclaims that
the TRIPS Agreement should be read in a manner that promotes
public health, particularly, univ ersal access to medicine.' 6 In
order to enhance public health and access to medicine, the Doha
Declaration states~ that WTO member countries have the tight to
issue compulsory licenses. Ironically, as is argued in the fbllowing
pairagraphs, by utilizing compulsory licensing as a v ebicle to adsvance
public health, the Doha Declaration actually demeans public health
because compulsory licensing leads to decreased innovation in
pharmaceutical products and grossly subpar medicine.
SThe Doha Declaration's objective of enhancing public health
in developing countries through compulsory licensing and
parallel imports is ineffective because the Doha Declaration
actually decreases incentives for pharmaceutical companies to
enter the market.
IThe patent protection intended under the ITRIPS Agreement
increased the incentive for investment by providing a period of
restricted competition, which would generate enough revenue to
enable patent holders to pay off the cost of their investment in the
product.' However, the Doha Declaration's allowance ofcompulsory
licensing and parallel imports weakened the integrity of the patent
and thereby decreased the incentive to conduct research and
development for much needed medication. 9 By permitting the use
of compulsory licenses and parallel imports, the Doha Declaration
substantially decreased the amount of money that patent holders can
potentially earn and thus destroyed the ability of patent holders to
recoup the cost of their investment; thereby impeding incentives to
conduct research and development on neglected diseases affecting
developing nations.80
1. The Doha Declaration grants member countries too much
authority to issue c ompulsory licenses, which deters investinent in
pharmaceutical research and developinent.
The Doha Declaration gives each member country the right to grant
compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds
upon which compulsory licenses may be granted.?1 This broad
discretion facilitates abuse by countries that use the compulsory
license to avoid buying patented products or to address non-urgent
health problems.82 For instance, when Thailand issued a compulsory
license for Kaletra, an AIDS medication manufactured by Abbot
Laboratories, Abbott Laboratories was already selling the drug to
Thailand at a substantially discounted rate.t In 2007. Thailand also
issued a compulsory license for Plavix. a heart disease medication. 84
Thailand's use of the compulsory license was controversial because
Thailand is a middle-income country, as opposed to a developing
nation; moreover, the compulsory licensing of Plavix served as the
first time a country issued a compulsory license for a medication
geared towards a chronic disease as opposed to an infectious
disease.8 5 This issuance may signal a new era where countries issue
compulsory licenses for drugs that treat illnesses beyond infectious
diseases and for any drug available on the market, which may
exceed the purpose of the Doha Declaration.86
Because of the Doha JDeclaration, countries may issue compulsory
licenses for xxhatever reason they choose, including broad
interpretations of xvhat constitutes the public interest> For
instance, the Doha Declaration allowss countries to determine that an
epidemic constitutes a "national emergency" for which the country
may issue a compulsory license.8 Thus. pharmaceutical companies
contemplating research and dcxvelopmcnt on a disease affecting
dcxveloping nations nowx haxve the added disincentive of knowing
that in the cxvent they dcevelop a successful ncxv drug, a dcxeloping
country may arbitrarily declare an epidemic a "national emergency"
and award compulsory licenses to copy the drug. 89 Forcing a patent
owner to give up their exclusive rights to the product or process
strips the patent of its entire purpose and prevents patent holders
from fully recouping the costs of their investments. 90 As a result,
the incentive for investing in research and development for new
medicines declines.91
2. The Doha Declaration s allowance of parallel imports
discourages pharniaceutical patent holders froi selling their
product in developing nations for cheaper prices.
The Doha Declaration interprets the TRIPS Agreement in a manner
that allows member countries to establish their own policies on
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights and thereby enables
each menber country the decision of whether to allow parallel
importation.9 'Without parallel importation, pharmaceutical patent
holders are more willing to sell their products at lower prices in
developing nations.93 This willingness stems from the knowledge
that their low-priced products will not be re-exported to undercut
their prices elsewhere.94 Honeverx, where the market for needed
medications is weak, the availability of parallel imports diminishes
this willingness to sell for less.95 As a result, many developing
nations are priced out of the market, without access to medication.96
Because pharmaceutical production is such an extensive and costly
process, pharmaceutical patent holders rely on patents to protect
their investment. Yet, compulsory licenses and parallel imports
destroy the patent protection that pharmaceutical patent holders
require for innovation. In doing so, compulsory licenses and parallel
imports discourage research and development for new medicine and
thereby restrict medicine in developing nations.
C. Compulsory licensing and parallel imports jeopardize the
public health in developing nations.
Despite their endorsement by the Doha Declaration, compulsory
licenses and parallel imports are not a panacea for developing
countries' access to medicine problems." The amount of time
it takes to issue a compulsory license can be lengthy while the
administrative and regulatory steps for negotiating and issuing a
compulsory license can be extensive and burdensome. Moreover,
the narrow scope and duration of a compulsory license provide
only temporary relief for countries seeking access to medicine.
Fear of trade retaliation from developed countries deters countries
from issuing compulsory licenses98 Additionally, parallel imports
prevent medication from reaching the general public in dcxveloping
nations and run the risk of creating loxv quality drugs that may harm
and ceven kill people.99
1. The Coinpulsoiy licensing proces s takxes too long and is too
complicated to provide countiries with the medicine they need.
Ihe Doha Declaration touted compulsory licenses for
pharmaceutical products as a mechanism to improxve public health
and, consequently, promoted compulsory licenses through broad
language of support; but the Doha Declaration failed to provide
specific requirements regarding the implementation ofcompulsory
licenses.t 00 This lapse failed to clear the various obstacles associated
with issuing a compulsory license such as the length of time it
takes to issue a compulsory license and the cumbersome process of
issuing a compulsory license. For instance, it took nearly three years
of negotiating for Malaysia to procure much needed antiretroviral
treatment after issuing a compulsory license.101 For those countries
in need of immediate access to medicine, the lengthy compulsory
licensing process prevents the public from receiving medicine,
thereby putting the public's health at risk.
Additionally, many countries find the process of issuing a compulsory
license too cumbersome, w hich prevents compulsory licenses
from being used.10' For example, after the 2003 council decision,
Canada modified its drug patent legislation to export drugs to least
developed countries.103 The goal was to facilitate timely access to
generic medicine and medical devices for developing countries. 104
Though the drug shipments were successfully shipped to Rwanda,
the regulatory process was so complex that no other developing
country has tried to order drugs from Canada.i0S
A country that lacks domestic manufacturing capacities must go
through a long series of different steps to import a drug issued under
compulsory license.106 The process is further complicated by the
fact that the steps must be followed each time a country exports the
drug, even if the same drug is exported to a different country.107
These complex procedures contradict the Doha Declaration's goal
of providing access to medicine because they make it more difficult
for countries to provide medicine for the public.108 Thus, for the
least developed countries, the amount of time it takes to issue
a compulsory license is too long, and the overall process is too
complex.109
2. Developing countries cannot rely on compulsory licesing as a
central source for access to medicine.
The compulsory license is an inadequate treatment for medically
needy countries.110 By continuously importing medicines, a
developing country will never learn how to sustain itself and will
remain reliant on other more developed countries." Consequently,
counties that are trying to establish their public health program and
gain access to medicine should not rely on compulsory licenses.1
3. Coinmpulsory licenses often result in trade retaliation.
Although the Doha Declaration proclaimed compulsory licenses
as a right, and despite the fact that most WTO member countries
hav e incorporated this right into their domestic legislation, WTO
members' gov ernments iarely awsard compulsory licenscs fbr
pharmaceuticals tor fear of trade retaliation.1 iWhcn Thailand
issued a compulsoiry license in 2007. the United Statcs retaliated
by placing T hailand on the Section 301 Report. which allows the
United States to place trade sanctions against those cotintries that
do not prov ide adequate intellectual property protection.11 4 South
Africa attempted to pass legislation enabling compulsory licenses
in 1997."" but the Clinton administration listed South Africa in the
Section 301 Report as a result. Consequently, South Africa dropped
its legislation."' Additionally, after Thailand announced its intent
to issue compulsory licenses, the United States listed the country in
the 301 Report.'
4. Allowing developing countries to resell medications via parallel
importation instead of dispersing the medicine to their citizens
deprives the public of much needed medication.
The WTO adopted the Doha Declaration to provide access to
medicine in low- to middle-income countries,- yet studies show
that parallel importing fails to result in a reduced price for the
consumer. Instead, parallel importation obstructs the ability of the
patent holders to engage in price discrimination across national
markets, thereby preventing developing countries from receiving
the lower priced medication that price discrimination creates.119
Additionally, parallel importing depletes the country's
pharmaceutical supply.t 20 For example, the widespread parallel
importing in Spain has resulted in frequent drug shortages,1/1
and the Spanish people lack access to medicine because Spain's
medicine is resold to other European countries. Sellers make more
money selling to other countries, and therefore, sell off a large part
of Spain's drug supply.122
5. Coipulsory licensing aid parallel imports provide dangerous
substandard medicine and, therefore, violate the Doha
Declaration 's coninitment to iiprovingpublic health.
The Doha Declaration recognized the protection of public health as
a paramount principle1 23 that necessitates the facilitation of greater
access to medicine.124 To advance access to medicine, the Doha
Declaration promoted the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement,
including compulsory licensing, and clarified that developing
countries may issue a compulsory license to produce a drug
domestically or may import generic drugs from other nations. 125
However, these flexibilities have created a public health hazard
because the medicine developing countries produce or receive is
likely substandard, due to a lack of regulation, with the potential
to result in fatal consequences and create drug-resistant viruses. 126
Thus, the flexibilities provided in the Doha Declaration, which were
intended to alleviate the problem of access to medicine and public
health, have merely exacerbated it.
Central to the Doha Declaration's promotion of public health is the
use of the TRIPS Agreement's flexibilities, notably compulsory
licenses and parallel imports, to prosvide universal access to
medicine)127 Yet major health concerns exist regarding the quality
of the dirugs acquircd v ia cotnpulsoiry licensing and parallel
importing.128 G~eneric drugs domestically manufactured or itmported
into deseloping countries aie typically of a lowser quality than drugs
produced by the larger pharmaceutical companies. and though
developing countries may produce the drug for a lowser cost, these
countries generally cannot produce the same product as the patent
holder. When drug manufacturers in developing countries fail to
prosvide exact sversions of the drug, they create ineffectisve medicines
that promote the growth of drug-resistant viruses.129
Drug production requires adhering to stringent procedures to
ensure quality, yet the smaller or lesser-knowx n drug producers
often lack the necessary quality assurances.130 The importance of
pharmaceutical quality cannot be overemphasized: a sub-strength
or improperly mixed formulation can kill a patient and create
contagious drug-resistant viruses.131 In the 1980s and 1990s,
contaminated medicines killed more than five hundred people in
Argentina, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Haiti and India. In 1998, a locally
made medication contaminated with diethylene glycol, a toxic
solvent, killed thirty-three children in India. 132
The undisciplined use and misuse of pharmaceutical drugs in
developing countries has led to resistance in such diseases as
tuberculosis and malaria.1ii Varying the manufacturing method
alters the drug and makes even the safest drugs harmful.1 Many
drugs are complicated to produce, and the involvement of multiple
manufacturers may lead to different>products.13
Developing countries also lack the capacity to regulate drug
manufacturing and are thus unable to monitor effectively the safety
and potency of the drugs.13 Developing countries lack safety nets
like the Food and Drug Administration and have difficulty enforcing
pharmaceutical legislation.1-3 For instance, China and India have
become major international suppliers of generic drugs, but quality-
control inspections are rarely conducted.3S As these countries
continue to carelessly manufacture more drugs, the risk to human
health grows exponentially 3 Counterfeit drugs, many of which
have expired and should be destroyed, are often sold as parallel
imports and have thus become a problem.140 Kenya allowed parallel
imports until 1997, when it banned the practice after the market
was flooded with unsafe counterfeit drugs of poor quality.141 Many
African cities have "grass pharmacies" makeshift pharmacies
set up in the streets-which sell medicines touted as antibiotics. 142
However, these drugs typically contain no antibiotic at all, 143 and
the authorities and domestic health organizations do not know the
origin of these drugs. 144 IThus, because of the many problematic
consequences of parallel imports and compulsory licensing,
simply flooding developing countries with less expensive drugs is
reckless. 145
To provide sustainable, long-term access to quality medication,
countries must look beyond compulsory licensing and parallel
imports. and instead adopt measures that incentivize innovation and
research and development. Preserv ing the integrity of the patent and
prutecting intellectual pruperty rights serve as one xxay to protect
the pharmaceutical patent holder's mv estmcnt in pharmaceutical
production. Other options consider relaxing patent protections
in exchange for adequate compensation to the pharmaceutical
company. Prescirving the incentixve of the~ pharmaceutical company
is v ital to encour aging research and dcxvelopment. Doing so will
pr omote progress in pharmaceutical innoxvation, proxvide greater
access to medicine, and help WTO member countries achieve their
goal of better public health. 146
A. Patent protection must be fortified with data exclusivity or
cost-sharing.
In many developing countries, when a company submits data to the
state's drug regulatory agency for the approval and registration of
a new drug, the regulatory agency enables other companies to use
this data to reproduce and market the same drug.147 Consequently,
the later registrant may free ride on the research and development
of the initial registrant and may market the drug without having
to replicate any of the prior testing performed by the initial
registrant. 148 Because the absence of data protection disincentivizes
drug developers from marketing their product in these countries,
data exclusivity has been touted as a possible solution.149
Data exclusivity refers to the process by which drug regulatory
authorities keep marketing approval data confidential for a set
period to prevent generic knockoffs.o Without data exclusivity,
drug developers have insufficient incentive to undergo the costly
trials and clinical research for drug production and marketing
approval because of the high probability that a generic producer will
recreate and sell the drug for much less. 151Generic producers use
the registration data to reverse engineer their own products and need
only demonstrate that their product is the therapeutic equivalent to the
original drug (bio-equivalency), thereby avoiding spending billions
of dollars in research and development.15 2 However, the generic
replication of drugs impedes drug developers from recouping their
billion-dollar investment in the drug. Consequently, data exclusivity
is a favorable option for drug developers because it keeps the
marketing approval data private and prevents generic knockoffs,
thus enabling drug producers to recoup their investment.153
However developing countries, in particular, argue against the
adoption of data exclusivity and explain that without the ability to
rely on the drug developer's marketing approval data, generic drugs
cannot be produced. The inability to produce generic drugs eliminates
competition and creates expensive, and thus inaccessible, drugs. 154
Another option focuses on using a "cost sharing" approach, wx hich
allows followx -on firms ("later registrants") to use the marketing
approval data of the initial registrant in exchange for adequate
compensation for the costs of testing.15 The cost-sharing model
prevents the creation of a monopoly period' 6 as well as duplicative
testing.>] After paying adequate remuneration to the initial
registrants, later registrants could begin marketing their products
as soon as they proved bioequivalence. IThis cost-sharing approach
proxvides coiipetition to consumers, whlich niay lowxer prices IThis
method also provides a xvay for the pharmaceutical mianufacturer to
recoup somie of thecir investment in the pruduct. Consequently, cost-
sharing is particularly effective because it addresses the concerns of
both drug dcvelopers and dceveloping countries.1
BPrize funds preserve the pharmaceutical ptent holder's
incentive to conduct research an development for new
medications.
Prize funds serve as an another viable option to promote innovation
and incentivize drug development. Prize finds provide large
monetary prizes, paid for by industrialized nations, to the company
that develops new medications and vaccines for diseases that affect
the developing world.15' The remuneration amount varies depending
on the health priority of the disease, the number of people the disease
affects, whether the cure or vaccine affects a neglected disease, and
whether the drug is an alternative treatment for an already existing
drug. 160 Drug developers are reluctant to develop drugs for diseases
in developing countries whose markets do not provide an adequate
return on the drug developer's investment.161 Prize funds create
the incentive, which combined with patent protection and price
regulation, supplants the revenue that drug development companies
lose when they develop medicine for the developing world.162 The
prize system separates the cost of innovation from the subsequent
higher price tag that a patent requires, thereby allowing new generic
medicines that can be immediately placed in the market. 163
C. Utilizing price differentiation would provide access to
medicine in developing countries.
Another approach to providing medication to developing countries
at lower prices involves amending the TRIPS Agreement to include
a tiered pricing system based on the income level and economic
prosperity of member countries. 164 Under this system, drug
developers would market drugs at a lower price in developing
nations than in developed nations. 165 Also known as differential
pricing, this system provides developing countries with cheap
medicines while enabling pharmaceutical producers to recoup the
cost of their investments.166 Though drug companies may initially
lose money by selling their drug at the lower cost to the developing
nation, they make up for the loss via the higher prices that they
charge the developed nations. Thus, the differential pricing system
reduces the financial barriers that prevent access to medicine in
developing countries.i61
D. Individual governments must accept greater responsibility
in protecting the public health of their citizens.
Developing countries will not progress in their access to medicine
unless the countries themselves make health care a priority.16 More
than 90 percent of the drugs on the World Health Organization's
(WHO) List of Essential Drugs lack patent protection and have
low price tags.169 However, because many developing nations have
an extremely low per capita spending on medicine, they cannot
afford to purchase the drugs, even at discounted rates.1 (o Developed
countries can continue to prosvide aid, and pharmaceutical companies
can continue to donate medicine, but until the countiries themselses
desvelop domestic legislation that spends more on adequate health
caie and creates regulatory agencies to promote the pubilic health,
all efforts ssill prose futile.1
In summary, the Doha Declaration cannot promote puhlic health
and access to medicine in deseloping countries. Compulsory
licenses and parallel imports prosvided by the Doha Declar ation fail
research and development for new pharmaceuticals targeting the
diseases that afflict the developing world. To advance public health
and access to medicine, WTO countries must either protect patents
or provide the pharmaceutical companies with adequate profits.
Otherwise, public health in developing countries will remain
stagnant, and access to medicine will continue to be impeded.
to offer a sustainable answer to the access to medicines problem and
create more problems than they solve. Additionally, without patent
protection, pharmaceutical producers lack an incentive to invest in
froms reein medicinemnov.isprv, lt ie ho
l he iu PrtI (d.etadilg the reainhpbtenthe TRIPS Agreoemlent",k' Vk'udol~iws rv o.-, o
Doha eclraton and counclil Deiinaddiscussing th,,e role of-paten't 1mDoV
protection-, in each)-.iA, ,,'~RS15 04
3 She inks Part iII (warini-,g a,,gai-.nst the potential Or decreased investmentt,", mos tegraert
inrs arch anddeelpm nid. overall access to medicine and questioning eFl~k-.a lto4 t17 hk1ngta li ol,- el
thle qu-al0ity offthe mt-edici-nes provided), dpe r cp~-s,\"c, W gen ei akah0'ac l
14 5e influ Part I V (protecting thle paten-t reisrnts aa pr-otects thirf- is~ facs o
moooypwrandO preserves un8(dovatngion) te
15 !Te INu Part IV (finding that phraetclpatent holders can sustain TnmAreetscu-d eitrrtdi
inoaimresearchl, addevelopment as lkong as it is financially worthwhile mmes ih opoettepbi loat) leDl~ elrto,'
to do so) cn .lde htteTISAgemn rvddclnusr i
16Se hik Part IV (hligthat phraeuia cma ies may charge o ti upo -- e
dleveloping countrllies less fOr miedication, if they chredeveloped countries e B,,nx 0 t14 h ollD
more, thus ena l tese com,,-panies to miake a profit while also providing anit fiudkko, ic -sngwssen's :l
mne d icine to coauntiek-s inl n'leed (1,panaeuti i opne)
17 2ei5, Pr IV (explaining that itraonlaid wvill be fluitless until 3)Sh oa Dkntnqslmoe6 z r,5(ecgi,-'4l ht
countries themsel ves invest in thle public health of- their peoople),othT- I-Arene li'toeaee.,c1lie-lb freto
18 7RIPAgreement, su -anote 4; see, eg., Marla,, L, Mellin,,o, Nkote., The oirgne1krtee-iutkr, o~~tleulpopot ,-git)
7RF~gemet:Hejin or- Zhrting LeastO Deele CoutresAces
to Evsential PhraetcasD2 OuAMITL PROP, MEJMA& Ea1r206)
LJ! 13499 1353 (2010)(explahiing the tninthe TRIPS Arentcreatedwhracony' met
between pharlmceutical companies, woneeded to earn a profit, and ta i,,,b~ r
developing countries, who) needed greater access to medicines)
* e Cynthia M, Hou, A! Ne-hl re rAdessingPaen Rights ee ito ".,alo->S .o,
and ullic Heali, 82 CvirL Runv. 1469) 1547,0 (2007) (explain6 -linlg raffx ,~dfh ihsoAAOmld~os tks t ~ n
that thle TRIPS Agreemnt established thle fihrs."t-ever minimium levels of Are in ihu culyclwgn nwtl,- ieT
paten-t rights onl aglobal scale); see,.a.lso Feldma-l-'n, sum ote 4, at 145 Areila)
(noting that as thle imlportanllce of in .tellectua~l property rightsb c more -lr h s
important, to international trade, ecnmc eso beten countries arose Doa, lto H .IV - 7 3(,(2
due to thle various,\ levels of intellectual p-,roperty protectionks), WTO memberik- udeusl"eablt fheptn 10drt "
naltions soughlt -to eaethis growving tensioni- b1y creatin ,g mnumlevels of tolarslaf-im wdhebypvrs
itrainlprotection-, for inelculproperty rights,conre i gnngaestolwrp-ea
a gJohn FI. Barton, TRIS andk theS7Global Pharmaceutical Marketg
23 HEAuvm Awin 146, 147-149 ('2004) (explaining that pharmaceutical Dc-ai"lca-fksteRP gemn otlo tNo--n~r '.'~
companlies rely onii patenlt protectionii 4Ar profits but that patentil protectionl hmevs l -o
presents a problem for least developed ountries wocntafrdthe higher e ycsi'- 'e3 a66Ootlght
priced medicine that results frmpatentin-g aprodulct,),,h-e io l ea ih.t e-ur . 4k
21 Se Feldmnk-,w, supaote 4, at 146 (xlingthat the broadl tex of the paeto)rvnt -mife
TISA reent in -cludes Article 31 whichathorizes teuse of ai patente-dat62
product without thle auhrzto- ofth paten-t holder), . i , etii g '1- O ~rle oiiseo eptr"
22Se IRIEA~gmrment, supmu noe 4,) anrt 31 (saigthat where the-, pofty
d3om, estic legislation of the WVTO mklem -ber country allows for co.mk--pulsory SeFM cerr&JysreWtl
licenses) the TRIPS -Agreem-en -t allows that country to isethe com-pulsory J'he s c- ,-93
license without the auhrzto ofthe right holder)yThis includes use by (oigfiz ospl
the goenetOr third p~arties authorize.(-d by the govrnent C Gerrnanol sdietdlw~. - IImaHC-1ipottm
sintm note 5, at 280 (detailint.g thlat, thoulh the text of thle TRIPS Agreemnen,,t lk4,aam,6(strig
dkoes n'ot explicitly refer to compulsory licensing, it is inferrd fro thle o drs ieimeo h xasin v oa
l anguage), 0a r.: poiigmme ih l'"aiiy stu
corin ercia termiins and! condlitions andl that these efors ave ntbeen Ml o o;MlEtrae 2 ,F.
su~ccessild within rasnal period ofltimle:"). However, in the ase olf Eo:-,\,51180( Q.Btse&"U:
a national em-ergenicy or kothier- extremergenc,,y or in cases kof pu-,blic nonl- ADI ,II
commrercial use, natiember country ma,,y wiethis requirerintt6 50(Njaolbe zht-/,~-h
45 Doh Declaration, supm noteo 6110 at artie
* De Ssule Musugu & Cecilia.: Oh-, The Usein~t oflxiiite ine TRIPS'lJ lgn i rg-tl,,re
O m Po R, IN -S lo ANJD PNO HmREAU 15 in200tio availablecrnle lll otl)
atol-' http://ww whos int/intellectualproperty/studiesaTRIPSFLEXI pdf
(tuigone of the benefits ocmplrylicensing to be th~e produlct.ion-, adfo e rg,
of gjeneric mledicationl wich provides greater access to me-idicinemt): see62& al.t49 ta lsreyon
also Myandy Wilson, Pharmaceutical drtent Ptetin More Genericf ie otoftatoliig N
, oed.egilatoMay Cause Pionee Druge Con'anie toig Pull thedeter o lIl- ,-,.dkl tk
Plu, g onInovtin 90 K-\. L, L 495, 496 (200)1) (holdin~g that generic
pharmaceutficals mauy cost less than patenlted versions and thus will be e> 47(ct-,gaCrqysinlBuge OfeSkd hl
accessible to moeofthe general population)-did not see: textual supRport frj caultosilixyevi e ofdoe roict tetp
this paenhtia fnailed aiboutl it), u e Amir Attaranl & L-ee Gillespie- ! ilo nttllIloee nyoetido htd~g, ,.,nd
White, Do to tentsl fore Antreroir Drugelr- Costdi Access-, la toAaSSg-atdrg
,latentikica?, 286 JAMA 1886, 1891 (2001) (teslting the hyothesis 6, a 9 t"tptn r~eton sas lno,
tat paten-ts are ai letadingp barrier to widespread AIDS treatme-wnt in Africa. and eitr, rftblt f",oeeoii
concluding that patents dlo not atas a barrier to ai'niretroviralol treatmnent in 15Bafed&-mk,,9,t6,
"7FjPs.Ageemnt, supra,,., note 4, at art, 3 1, h netr lteCri' p"1C -K lut flln) n
48 See! Feldmanl, supm , note 4, at 137 (epli ingtat article 3 1 was rs"'rhaddeeointwilgnrcaeabb
essentially useless to the countries that weret in n-eed of compuldsory license~s itVey-tlecosA)
themotecaseitprevenlted~ those Countries that lacked mianulfacturing
capabilities firom- issuling a coploylicense),6
9 Rg, Mellino, supmz note 18, at 1359-60 (poininlg ou-t that a compulsoryr onpalitst
licenseroide pr vides p t. littlentr thhelp fbrt fa a country atue aproitdoesdeuanot h vel theze-ril manufacturings, ris11
ab ilit to make use of the license)
* S Geman, syn (-noe 5,at 282 (declarinig that -the TRIPS 1lnguage
pr-evented cutiswith ai domnnestic genlerics industry fromi exporting drugs 7 h yks, nt 3 t6 ptn ,, ,dl-itdsuyb
to couintries that lacked indoustrial capacity). 6% l inth
e Le Mell in o, sq note 18,k at 13 59-60 (highlightinlg that a country
lackin~g adequate mlanufac~turing capacity coldc noct ut.-ilize complts, ory atvslusnoe5,t27(nrsigfi pia
licenses under Article 31(f) andl a, coun-try that coldo utililize the comipulsory ni-tYWthoheidures\ld lat poJic
license cudonly pr-oduice thle licensed tochnology f'or its domnestic use anr'd inutya, r-oe 16dpnkr"toal otctn)
could not imnport the products to other couintries), oeRbr RP-Pi loliosi-,-'l'aeAre-
DoaDcaB in ur note 6,n atar , (eognizing that WTO mnibers Cosat(i
with insufficient or nomni trn g capacity cannot efc116,-tively uitilizet
coplsr icen'sin -g under the TFRIPS Agremnt language)vda ha rn-l\ l-e~tie drli, evlpns.t
See gen,,,,erall Feldmnan, stynii note 4, ait 147.48 (xaingthle differentvie 1 ton n-"ltvel- eeko ,a
portions of article 31 thl-at the coclDecision waived, including the ilat4atpv-rba,
rqieetl hat pr-oductls pr-odulced uinder comnplsory license be utilized Aa n ( l .o ,,laptn t
solely for dom- nestic su~pply) ta gitt rvlo tidpriswlcktewnl osn, oSe Grmao, syn (-noe 5,at 283 (noting that oni Decemnber 6., 2005
the WVTO miem--bers approved anlmedmn to T1RIPS that ld maike6,t i,4fl-at-a TISArt-nel sok
the- conis decisions pelrm'anentt but, twotlhrds ofteWTO memtl-nbers
mustc approveete the amenmen bear itl may be incorporatedl- ino heTRP
research- and devlopen costs)zmnoeIk t136 a 2
S he Valach, supgm note 23, at158; (emphasizing that patent hiolderstht(lf a1-aldi c&W Mnbe avacqpu
typically dislike coploylicenses because it enables the goenmn of3C( ln1 D ,n s., ,'l enttc, 1RIPSA,,, ee- w
anot her - cuntry to stip a, paten-hoder o)f thle patent's protcin)cfSks
syqpru noe 33" alt 63 (contending that parlliel iprsreduce thI'e retulrin on lcls~>al agtli ha hi ~get' hi
hloldin,-g a kpatent), ie sn r,,e kiesin,,l et,
0 Ste Sykes, stqa ot 33, at 66-67 (agigthat if a patentt holder's,',-i~nylg 18-2
invenition may be copied and sold by comllpetitrs, the price of!'the druig SeFlnra, nM 4 st19(ssl--,ghti-ew rd- '
is driven, down to the magnlprice of waeritcosts sthe generic .ljcivegldllleprvdska-eoprtl tyl6 blo\eliith.
prmocer to mauttuete drulg anid thuls doc-es not ac Ofr the exopense wilhv "ieate
thatw the patent hold&er paid f'br research anld dvopet As a resuilt,Sh5,a28-7
inlve-ntors will nlot be able to recoup their costs o~f inv tion ths, potential SeDifik 7 i 2 saiii hti ts-ine
inetos noigths ill be unwilling to incur thle Costs of research and pi ~ fr l~- ptn w-w srqie stl-
development and thusinvtinwl be stifled- a ecmlctd aea till
s eFeldman-kl, spr note 4, at 149 (agigthat thle TRIPS Agreemenact mlia 'oe1,o 347 ntn htlgsai
lan"gua.,ge is tobroad, that the wording is too flex-ible, and that it lacks(Ae'Orlcopxanadrques so
obetv udelie) Ths fo sters coploylicen -se abuse and mnrisuses of'slat ee1,~n
thlis stronlg governmental riglht il h-ave detrhiental conseqences
" e eerly ii at 15 1-2 (detailing thle con trovers ial compulsory licenses
issued by Thiailan-dl, Brazill, and Rwandaand n tinltis unlimited sco-pe (epangth',tl -. vtd--i one o 26
o3f compulsory licensing will cause hamcetia com--pan -ies to decrease WA adtiwlchaZdwldheL
ietent in drugs for fear that th~ey will not earn profits); see\, -,1 alo Aileenl lid ir''i-eadwslaifcurd nClnda yA,-txlc
MV McGill Cnnor-y Lienin a1tete Pharaceuicah A-Pty Aa W7Dhv B e-rnpc i~e
Achinitraiv Bodysh toul Deerin Whataie tnstitutes Public r agraltho
Wisis Under theLL Doha Delrain I9 031 Wthe FOcense Ioth Pompoiie LAd 69.
96 (20\'09) (concluding that the terms (ofthe Doha Dcaainare too broa,.:d, r c seilyf -lr" "t
allo,,winlg co-,untries to issue com-puilsory licenises for- medcaios hat d"1o -not ioitWwatypoqI o, -lkei "ail o,
treat lietraeigillnesses, such as Via,,,gra ando Plav,.,.ix)j Many counstries Mlio ip oeIka 32
have seen a dramatic drop inl Foreign- Direct Investmnent (FDI)as a. result o~f' t t17-4(oig htbcueo rvs( -si teC
extenlsidve comgpulsory licensing (ofpatented phrm--a cetiicaols, making least sauedaz :,& td ie -l ,eeR .vld",w- kldu
developed countries hesitant to) invoke the terms of the Dohla Declaration for hr"lgttleniepocsaanWtNvueo1 ,-o)erdrheamd
f ea r o)f s im-ila r l o)s ses i-n R'DI aayp. yse-'lhs "-lybel(yCli
e 14 at 151aditw.,\-1pe rocs ecis w
15Id at 1 5 1, th ti ilhp el.,giwtl. ~elea "ok-e
11. at 15 1-2,Se v-iac-,21 i'16-9(xli-fmg t
' he Doha Declaration, siqum note 6, atarlt, 5 (em-rphasizing tha each' g: ag% "-
mebrconrla~s the freeom t decide the grud pnwhich arrpl ,dkl)
coploylicen'se mlay be granted aind also-, ma,':y decterin~le whtconstitultes I'lmit1)
a nainleegny.Public h-ealthi crises, count as nationail emnergencies Or 103Sei.(amtngtls"p eu- wc- s-'ol-i
" eDa. Delraton seqa noe 6g'--, at-ol artA 5elrto"bcus twl onpikz'ai
*Sykes, sequa note 33, at 66, ,ltnsvn mdicai()
" e Gruabowi,vsequa n',ote 57, at 851 (asserftng th-at it -takes an extensive a-I6(oiein im eeoigc~l--re lli- h
amounit omoeteand rsucsto discover anid create a, new mnedicine a tcfetpembldrgRunoedvfi d o-
an w ithou patent pro.tectionl, imitators may free ride oni the innovator'
clinical data. anid create duaplicate drugs fbr a fatoofwhat it cost thIeeayces o,
M. h; see abo Feldman, sur oe4, at 142 (hligthat if compulsory1 almvngth
Enurope'anl- Comm"llission, efife"ctively keptmotgvr ensfmisug
st oe Melinro, ur note 18,q at 1369 (explanin that the United Statecs -oprie. kcahwEstedilgislv,.ollpcleyades
Traide Representaitive created the Special 301 Report to list andic11 give n-otice to tseI-"
countries that it believes comm---nitted trade violation- s), 3 h .(oi-ga etosvn e--rc16rn s of ,iiadtlrt
I% h Bess-Carolina. Dolm, rainn Globail A4ccess t.o to ratsentialresr eattihr-' 7-egenrc v''r
PhraetclMnte heombetPoection Rights The South AIcan1 WsenEloe ivscriEloeadAfic n htg on is
7rne TBUFF. HUM. RrS. L RIEw. 137 (2001]) (explaiiing that the IVl/ 111ottws..Iert steba-, rg n ru wsvr
AIDS crisis in Souith- Af"rica prom-Zlpted the govern-rnenat to en-Iact Section det oiiiydfirne ftw"-.wl- Ieilusd
1 5(c) of, the Souith African Medicin~es and Medical Devices Regulatory Act 13M.se is&Oalysqnzot41,t40
(SAMM",,-1DR A), which auhrzdparallel imports aind com~puilsory licensing dvlpn;ctlre ~vep'wdu
withi the objec-tiv'e of alilowin~g easier access to aiffordable drugs)el rcdugratficie nlal.i,,iscriiedb h -
*Sete Melin~o, suqptv note 18, at 1377 (holding'; countries are mnindfull of bu nlyol-e dgInailitkrs illda lIt1,d
the effects that copulsory licensing can have on' foreignI direct qklinvestmentsrlchcEvll lhclklhths enrc ae ds
because plaicemient on watch lists like the Sectioni 30-1 Report can lead to nn l hed-e'pu ol I o wl obyten(iet u
trade sanctions; -)eis
- at 1376, 7 -1ho
11 Site Geranseu oteA 5, at 274 (expla-6iing t-ha.t concernie regardingak'tbca~-e ftei ac fa.dv
access to aforabe edicin-e in developing coun-,tries led to the Doha ~ f~d b'. 1lC~at-adsledu eeoiet
Declaration) 
-- c--nI&Oksyxi-oe4 t4(]da iii
"'See inQ; Part fIII (describing the benefits of price discrimiination in termis 200 Itteei ,lYltl
of providin~g access to mnedicine), ,:,r a.1"-w, 01il ",
12o She Shermnn & Oakley, supa ote 41, 375 (noting thlat parallel P:'SJN T 07 i tp/N1n,
imlporting decreases the need Wr couintries to esals oetcdrulg 20 )10251 ,,-, Iet--~ httwU a .22C~-lt-s
mnanulfactulring;), npcin cmutd noeyawic ldOl Il.i 111
" iat 13 7 6,
n e Dohai Declaratrions", sqanote 65, at art, 4, 5 (a,,greeingq that the TRIPS St hrnn&0,lly jr oe4.a 0 hligta
Agreem ren-t does not anld should n~ot preve-nt W-TO memcn"bers fwomi taking Il-~y"fso o~niliadk-qat ri~iaini nt
mneasulres to proC-tec-t puiblic health, such as complsor licensing) ptnta W ll.Iroe' a~erkl~ i
124 Se,, Shermnnun & Oakley, supa ote 41 , at 367 (affining thiat the DOha drq)
Declaration held that the TRIPS Agreemnent can and shlould be interpreted at,42(ollglitli Kna,.co'seinty.hlg-
and! imnplemernted in a. manner tha.,t s-upportIsIWTO mnenibers' right to) protect podbtpna'Iliaot eas hr ZNo
pu~lblic health.f an-d, inparticular, to prom,'-'ote a."ckcess to m--edicines for everyone)
eii(reaffirm-ing that the Dohla DeclIaration grants to WTO m -enabers G,
the righit to uise: the provisions in the'TRIPS Agr eement to) the fiillest, which ,,T-as Ar 4 0 ,ricbec
the Dohfla Dec larati on- believes prom--otes its goa\'l Of access to meiin) ee
als o Feldm,--Ian, siqua note 4,.-at 160\ (exlaiingtht te DhaDecaraio
clarifies that developing n tions uable to domestically mnainufactuire drulgs 141M
are authiorized to rmport generic drugls fromi nations with manufacturingak heabliy ,
* Sh Fedma, squanote 4, a.-t 160 (exlanig thtdvelopihng are lik~ely
to imnport dr-ugs frVoml the uinr-egullated plants and thattlhese contamninated and sneteW ',cnitosysifie npaiaetwlpohc
iec ivegeerics are very dIfllt to traick d'on--)' rgwl
12 Se:e idat14 (frmngta't the Doha, Declaration held th-at the TRIPS "".e&Okey l-oA ,i 01
-Agremn t miust be imiplemnlted mna mnanner supportive of pxiblic health and I,,-t44T---"
thiatk its flexibilities, which inclulde comnpullsory licenises and thie exhauIstionl of ao, ,X el-reb.S w-,
intellectuial property rightsl, ma\y be utilized to prom-,-ote public health), newtoi au
She Shermnan~, & Oakle, supra notec 41, atl 401 (epaiigthat imnitationa4 -,,43,474 20)
competitionl and compulsory licensing; would SubttstantiAally ameliorate thle SeEt,, err' t
lack of access to drugls in the develooing world IS AVJ, 1,1 (07 I..O.piz ful
e elmth spaot-47 at 481 (hghihtn th une th costs r
shamring approach, later registrants woul not have to re peat th initialdeloigwrdth,,o co-ilicrasn.doott
registrnt'~s da, ta testAing so long a:,s th-ey paid ain equal portion- offthe costsmet)
of the test), TI'o dtrnethe amutof compqensation owed, the total costs 3eJ,.ui &7ln T" 8g Pr,-eso.
asociat-ed with g inin arket approval are divided by thle num-l-ber of e ac-,s.8 m-m ,R,-.,1 5 2007 e
registrairt-s and each later registran-t reimbriurses the initial registrant 4Ar that t- l ate low ieiuhldrtoeo'. teCstf
" See id,(otn that asson s com-petmi,-g dru~og m-nanufatcturers provedI 14SeImnmin,
bieuvlneto thle initial registrant's data, they could beglin marketi-ng -,%,-'A,-.A,-LJiC, F)RVCCNs
the product in developing countries and thereby prov,.ide coma-petition- to)(niug aooh,-eaz'...fanq
consumers), lla-fee
58Se Fellmethi, sn note 147, at 481 (explaining th'at con-sum-ers., woulld -taiWli-,br NeM mtom
benlefit lorn thle com--petition in- the drug m,'arket. dule to the lower pricesD"ts si4cs,.osi"L
due to thle remnertio ib their research and developrnent)ae o teGD o~ac r-n,-le
S' e- Jooseph Stilglitz, Give Priz..-,es Not 11tets N6w Selnt S3o', 17,--40
20061, ava.-ilable at7 htt:/ww newscientist 16com/article/dno10090-innovation-
a-etrwyta-aet~tl(oigtha the Prize Ssenincludes a flund eeoi-,,,,cutisreIepel-ypied esthn1pret
in Which gvrmnswudcontribute large sums of mon'ey and] eey Year C s acnsi ihrcutis
thle fRinds wold( be allocated to firms that bringnwpout tite nmrket);
see alsoT RD it!an JAMES LovEaA Mar TKkae FDowr FoN Ado (lMo J'7Loan.-, OL IAI R
IRETH QIRE R 9 2 PLOS B otou 147 (2004, L availble nat http://w ww "llo...~c
(hig~hlilghting; that this payment to thle innovative firmr would provide theahc'~~ay' elhsytinadoeo'h isjratrqwt
proper reueainto icnvzedr-ug producers to develop new drulgs repniltyinro-dhgacss od',qs,
while also enbigthe introduction l of generic coml-petition) Gak,.\.sh no57at8610utf g"is's rur
16 hse James Lovwe) Meaure tocesiilt Enhancee Acces too Meiclthcnoeis
andu AwAtos ftmlaigMdia &D 40 Uj.C. Divi.,s L, REV, 679, bet ibI\ n i1 *i. ,IIIeCIiCf-lef')- sei- , J sesaei
70001(206)allwig reater rewards Or innovative product anYeseo
"me too" products,,, tha.:t work n-o betfter thanl existing pr-oduocts, proves more 17)'eloat87Qmni-gon lf.t ve-lners
16 Se Grabowski,snt note :57, at 856 (asserting there is a low potential thi oliitre.)
Or sales in thew makesof developinlg count-ries and tectth thee llir-tt,,rl ~eGllsi-htD-,
1governments of these deeoigcutisinvest almost nothing to Combat Drg --es?,26 ANI"
disease and maemdcn oeac'cessible firther exacerbates the problem (01 ie-g-ii gta .cnrhls v cesp,:"'-
o" -I c e S,)Prdes 1o ILSPom le JONApLe ar18e(2007)t(aruin tatcrie fund
inlcentaiver drudeeloer-slto roc,;e miine tor h iessi h
devling wlal-olh,g trecnoi reasons , dontatract irsc n
ldveopmnenfli t) du;rgdtr rcdrs .
